In this article I evaluate a resurrected French resistance movement-to biotechnological commodification. The official French view that 'the body is the person' has been dismissed as a 'taboo' by the French political scientist Dominique Memmi 2 • Yet France has indeed resisted the models of globalised commodification adopted in US bioechnology, as, for example, when the government blocked a research collaboration between the American firm Millennium Pharmaceuticals and a leading genomics laboratory, le Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme Humain, on the grounds the 'French DNA' should not be given away.
This example, however, itself suggests why the 'new French Resistance' is not altogether liberating. The absolutist conception of all bodies as belonging to the French state-indeed, as constituting the body politic 3 -is so potentially invasive that a counter-ideology of inviolability of the body is maintained assiduously. This inviolability is defended particularly strongly against commercialisation, but only at the moment when tissue is taken from the individual subject, who is not to be paid or compensated-although commercial enterprises who subsequently use the tissue are not similarly constrained.
In fact the French insistence on the gift relationship actually leaves the individual patient or research subject powerless, while affording copious opportunities for commercial interests to commodify and use the biological material given freely by the patient. French law generally lacks the notion of property as a bundle, which affords English and American jurisprudence potential opportunities for protecting the subject against unauthorised taking, for example. 4 Rather, property is possible arguments. That agreement was possible in the 29 opinions over which he presided was due, he believes, to concentration on practical regulation rather than foundational debate on concepts such as the status of the embryo. 15 Whereas there has been tacit agreement to bury the subject of the embryo's status, however, the Committee has continued to blazon its public unity around the concept of non-commodification. Indeed, noncommodification has such a totemic status in the opinions of the CCNE, the bioethics laws and the civil code that it appears to be the equivalent of le drapeau tricolore: all parties rally behind its symbolic imagery, whatever their disagreement on other issues. In this symbolic role, the principle of non-commodification also functions to proclaim French exceptionalism: to distinguish France from supposedly less ethical nations, particularly the Anglo-Saxon countries, who, in turn, are rarely differentiated from each other. For example, in its 1990 opinion number 21, 'That the human body should not be used for commercial purposes', the CCNE wrongly but proudly states that 'The view of French law on this problem is clear. It does not accept that the human body should be used for commercial purposes. The body is not an object and cannot be used as such; for instance, blood and organs are not for sale, a position which is rarely encountered elsewhere. ' The UK blood donation system, an obvious exception based on free donation, is not mentioned.
In 1984, the year after its establishment by ministerial decree, the CCNE's very first opinion had already denounced the commercial use of foetal tissue 16 • However, it is in two opinions specifically concerning the human body and the human genome that the committee's position is most clearly seen, shorn of the polarising debate around the status of the embryo. 17 The first of these two reports, 'That the human body should not be used for commercial purposes', begins by reiterating the consistent stand taken against commercial use of human tissue throughout the Committee's opinions to date. In the French civil code 18 , as restated in the CCNE opinion, 'the human body or one of its components cannot be the object of a contract.' No distinction is made here between sale and donation:
For instance, an organ such as the kidney, cannot be sold by the person to whom it belongs and, even if it is donated free of charge, cannot be sold by a third party, however much the would-be recipient or his entourage insist on it. Such insistence may be tantamount to blackmailing dependent individuals, for example prison inmates or misused minorities. Human dignity is at stake if financial gain becomes the result of physical weakness, however temporary. 19 This rapid move to questions of social justice and power relations typifies the French style: individual consent from the kidney seller is 45 not sufficient to outweigh questions about protecting the vulnerable. 20 However, despite the obvious contrast with the discourse of rights and autonomy more prevalent in Anglo-Saxon bioethics, there is also a surprisingly Lockean proviso in the CCNE opinion: 'The body or its organs are neither paid [sic] nor sold, but that is no reason to refuse payment to those whose work is involved. In that case, what is expressed in monetary terms is not the value of a body or a component of the body, but that of the work of observation, sampling, analysis and processing which they make possible.' 21 That is, once labour has been mixed with the tissue, those performing the labour may rightfully lay claim to it: the logic of the majority opinion in Moore. In fact this aspect of the CCNE's reasoning is conventionally liberal, making no distinction between a kidney, for example, and tissue such as enucleated ova produced by women's reproductive labour. Arguably the effect of this argument is not to empower the individual patient, but to give free rein to commercial interests.
If the CCNE position on tangible property in human tissue is actually quite conventionally liberal, despite French exceptionalism, its opinions on intangible property in the genome are rather more unique. In its 1991 opinion 27, 'That the human genome should not be used for commercial purposes,' the committee sets out two relevant principles 'to which the Committee attaches the most fundamental importance.' One of these is our old friend, 'the inviolable principle that the human body cannot be put to commercial use.' 22 The other is the argument that the human genome is the common property of humanity as a whole, translated in French as patrimoine de l'humanite. Although this principle may seem familiar to non-French readers from its appearance in the United Nations Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 23 , for example, and in the related concept of the genetic commons in the Anglophone bioethics literature, 24 it takes a rather different form in French thought.
Patrimoine, patriarchy and protection
The narrow meaning of patrimoine is essentially heritable private property: those things of monetary value which come under the control of an individual. Even in this narrow construction, patrimoine conveys a social meaning, as 'the social extension of the person.' 25 Historically, under the strongly patriarchal system of Roman law, this was of course a male person, and we should remain alert throughout this discussion to the connection between patrimoine and patriarchy. In the French context this link is particularly suspect because of another connection, that between solidarity and fraternity. French bioethics opinion, at least as expressed in the CCNE's opinions, reiterates the importance of solidarity. As the American sociologist Paul Rabinow has written, 'After all we have learned about the historical restrictions on the public sphere from feminist historians, especially of France, it is hard to see how the passing of all forms of fraternity [sic] is to be regretted.' 26 Rabinow might have added feminist political theorists, such as Carole Pateman, who have drawn attention to the explicitly fraternal nature of the social contract and its exclusion of women. 27 What I want to do here, however, is primarily to examine how French public policy and jurisprudence concerning property in the body, particularly property in the genome, also rely on an implicit broader meaning of patrimoine. The wider connotations of patrimoine concern this social meaning, and by linguistic inference the links with patrie. These two meanings, narrow and broad, are linked by the notion ofheredity. 28 As elaborated by the nineteenth-century jurists Aubry and Rau, patrimoine even its narrow sense already carries a notion of indivisibility and thus of communality, at least within its original community of ownership-a family whose common goods would have constituted a patrimoine. Furthermore, even in its narrow sense, patrimoine concerns rights of disposition between testators and inheritors, not to be alienated to others outside the circle of inheritors. 29 'Thus the patrimoine is always that of a continuous succession of individual proprietors.' ('De ce fait, le patrimoine est toujours celui d'une succession continue d'individus proprietaires.') 30 There are restrictions on how something belonging to the patrimoine can be alienated, of which 'no commercial usage' is one of the most important in biomedicine, particularly in relation to the national genetic heritage. That prohibition, in my interpretation, only applies to the original alienation from the patrimoine, which can only be justified if it is a gift from one member of the community to another. The American sociologist Paul Rabinow traces this nationalistic emphasis back to the French Revolution, when the wealth of the nation was no longer to be identified with the detested monarchy and Church, but rather with the sovereign people itself. By as early as 1794, the sale or destruction of this wealth had already come to be prohibited: it was to be preserved for the newly sovereign people aloneY Rabinow goes on to note: 'Previously the task of patrimony had been dutiful transmission of goods; today it is protection.' In its frequently invoked role as guardian of national identity, patrimoine now functions to protect French cultural and biological identity against the threats posed by globalised biotechnologies. Thus, as Rabinow puts it, 'the invocation of "genetic patrimony" fits snugly with the main symbols of French bioethics: menace, integrity, identity.' 32 One way of viewing the limitations imposed by patrimoine, in modem terms, is the parallel with provisions of a will which constrain the uses to which an heir can put his or her inheritance. A better analogy, I would say, is the manner in which ancient systems of property transmission typically emphasise keeping the wealth of the household intact more heavily than the individual rights of any member of the household, even the head. Thus in archaic mainland Greece wealth was seen as belonging to the household, not to individual heads except as temporary stewards of the property of the oikos. 33 Filtered through a Roman rather than a Greek lens, the communal model also continues to influence French law through the concept of patrimoine. In its modem form, consciously revived by many French jurists and philosophers, 34 this wealth includes not only fungible property, or the environment, but also the genetic 'endowment' of the nation. Tissue may also be included: notably the placenta, which the mother is presumed to have made available for albumin extraction in order to 'maximise the patrimony'. 35 Whereas the altruistic and explicit donation of blood, from which albumin may also be extracted, is stringently protected, placental tissue is assumed already to belong to the nation: no consent is required. Women's tissue, such as the placenta, is subsumed in the patrimoine on a different, more archaic and less voluntary basis than tissue which may also be found in men, such as blood. Just as women's consent is not required for the Rousseauesque social contract, so women's control over the tissue taken from their bodies is less complete than men's. In a sense their bodies are already assumed to be part of the patrimoine. Thus the concept of patrimoine provides insufficient protection for women; but even in relation to male tissue, it is also ill-suited to regulating the interplay between commercial interests, patient groups and the public in relation to the new globalised biotechnologies.
It might be thought that contributing to the patrimony by donating blood or tissue is neither altrustic nor egoistic, because those contributing are themselves members of the nation which enjoys the wealth of the patrimoine. However, this mutual gift relationship fails to take into account the way in which 'the new enclosures' transfer what was previously communal wealth into the hands of a new, globalised set of proprietors. While the individual French tissue donor is limited to altruistic donation, en aval, downstream, commercial interests are not constrained by such norms of gratuitous donation. Thus factors belonging to the modem market system creep in. The civil code, with its emphasis on the inviolability of patrimoine, is a product of a nonmarket society and of a period in which tissue and organs were not detachable from the living body.
What we see here is in fact a pre-market model, similar to that which obtained in the Athenian oikos, but more closely related to that of the absolutist French state. In France the effect of democracy, in its direct Rousseauesque variant, was to transfer the personality of the monarch wholesale, to the people as a whole. 36 It is the sovereign 48 people which exercises power and enjoys rights in this formulation of democracy; individuals are also accorded rights by virtue of their membership in the collectivity, but not as individuals per se. The collectivity, or body public, is primary. Liberal democracy, by contrast, conceives of the individual in the state of nature as the basic building block, and of the state as secondary, formed through the social contract and limited by the rights of individuals. Just as liberal democracy's building block is frequently said to be the autonomous property-holding individuaP 7 , so in the French model of direct democracy the unit of power is the collectivity of individuals, and the locus of wealth the collective patrimoine.
Just as the physical and moral person of the absolutist monarch embodied the state, so now do the persons of all French citizens collectively comprise the French republic. French law does not accord the individual a property right in his or her own body; in important respects it still conceives of the citizen's body, particularly but not exclusively the human genome, as belonging to the state. This incarnation of the state in the collective bodies of its citizens can also be seen as the outcome of two merging traditions, according to the French bioethicist Anne Fagot-Largeault.
In the Roman Catholic tradition, the church is viewed as the (mystical) body of Christ (in the protestant tradition there is no such mediation of an institutional body between man and God). In the French (and English) tradition of monarchy, the King incarnated the nation ... Both traditions merged in France: the Gallican church and the Catholic King embodied the 'patria' (or 'crown'), that is, the spiritually and politically structured community, the 'domain' of which could not be 'alienated' ... This notion of an organic community transcending individuals seems to have been secularized, and resumed rather than reversed, by the French republic. What the 1789 revolution brought about was the guarantee that no member of the community may freely dispose of the body of any member (not even his/her own), which reinforced rather than cancelled the notion of a vertical dependence of citizens from [sic} the State (relations between the parts had to be mediated through the whole.) 38 Reading French bioethics and jurisprudence in light of this double tradition reveals unexpected meanings behind the official doctrine. Both the civil code and the bioethics laws firmly declare that 'The human body, its elements and its products cannot be the object of a patrimonial right' ('Le corps humain, ses elements et ses produits ne peuventfaire ['objet d'un droit patrimonial') and that the human body is therefore inviolable ('Le corps humain est inviolable. ' 39 ) But does the second flow from or require the first? After all, the common law also preserves inviolability of the body without an equivalent emphasis on non-commodification. Another sort of logic is really at work here, I think. 49 The patrimonial right of which the human body cannot be a subject refers to the narrower sort of patrimoine. The broader meaning of patrimoine, the body politic or the state, takes precedence over the narrow meaning of individual worldly goods in the French context. It is this very dominance of patrimoine as equivalent to the French nation which necessitates strongly reiterated assurances in law and jurisprudence that this dominance is no longer absolute. Thus, in an ironic sense, it is precisely because the human body is identified with patrimoine in its broader sense, that the narrower sense of patrimoine must be invoked in the assertion that the human body cannot be the object of a patrimonial right. Because the state's rightful potential control over the body of its citizens is unbounded, it becomes particularly crucial to restate the doctrine of human dignity and inviolability of the body. What at first appears an attractive and consistent insistence-that the human body is in no way a thing and cannot become property-actually flows from the diminished nature as subjects of French citizens. They are subjects insofar as they are members of the patrie and share in its patrimoine, but they lack full control over their bodies insofar as those bodies are part of the patrimoine. They are in fact both subjects and objects.
Because the individual body is in fact the object of the nation's patrimoine, the inviolability of the body extended under the Napoleonic code to a prohibition on self-mutilation, including vasectomy and sterilisation. The underpinning principle was that the body was inviolable except in cases of therapeutic necessity. Doctors performing either procedure were subject to criminal charges, although in fact sterilisations (particularly on mentally handicapped individuals) were performed far more frequently than vasectomies 40 , indicating that the notion of the body's inviolability is strongly gendered. (Current legislation (Loi no 2001-588 du 4 juillet 2001) now allows both sterilisation and vasectomy, but under strict terms, including a required period of four months between the first consultation and performance of the procedure. Similarly, IVF is restricted in France to married couples or to heterosexual partners of at least two years' standing. 41 .) Such narrow boundaries on eligibility are most easily understood in terms of the notion of reproduction as a patrimonial state interest, even though it is presented in terms of the natural order 42 and of the child's best interests 43 • (They are, needless to say, detrimental to lesbian parents, although a recent case allowing a lesbian partner to formally co-adopt her partner's children may be a straw in a differently prevailing wind 44 .) A very telling example of the difference between Anglo-Saxon and French perspectives in this regard can be found in the CCNE's 2002 opinion number 74, 'Umbilical cord blood banks for autologous use or for research'. Rather than posing the question in terms of benefits to individual babies or the choice of individual couples, the CCNE opinion 50 condemns the private banking of cord blood for autologous use as a breach of social solidarity:
Preserving placental blood for the child itself strikes a solitary and restrictive note in contrast with the implicit solidarity of donation. It amounts to putting away in a bank as a precaution, as a biological preventive investment, as biological insurance ... There is major divergence between the concept of preservation for the child decided by parents and that of solidarity with the rest of society. 45 The notions of social solidarity and ordre public, likewise derived from the absolutist state but consciously reinforced in the nineteenth century as a deliberately constructed counterweight to the instability of the Republic and the power of the Church. 46 , thus play a coherent and consistent role in France. Solidarity is not necessarily seen as preexisting: the CCNE opinion on biobanks, for example, speaks of 'constructing' it consciously through benefit-sharing. 47 Nor is it unproblematic: the CCNE opinion on 'Consent in favour of a third person' 48 clearly sets out the conflict between solidarity and autonomy, neither of which necessarily trumps the other. What is noteworthy is simply the prevalence of solidarity-centred arguments in the French context, linked to the notion of the body politic and to patrimoine in its broader sense. The example of umbilical cord blood also links back to that of the placenta: here again, a tissue which is extracted from women is treated as a particularly suitable subject for solidarity.
Gift and altruistic donation
Solidarity is linked to gift, whose centrality in French bioethics is generally dated back to the two World Wars. Before World War I blood was paid for, and some commentators fear that the effect of European Community membership will be to reinstate a market system along the lines of the German one. 49 During the 1980s 'le drame du sang contamine', when over 2000 lawsuits were filed by patients receiving transfusions infected with HIV, provoked an intense national debate over gratuitous donation. Was the debacle due to bad medicine or bad ethics? Could more intensive scrutiny of donors prevent future crises, or was it offensive to screen those who were coming forward purely out of the goodness of their hearts? Although such scruples might seem oversensitive, it was argued by some that a policy of screening would encourage homophobia, given the higher prevalence of the HIV virus in the gay population. Others feared that the donor's position at the centre of a system founded on trust and solidarity would be threatened: 'calling him into question, even if only partially, would risk undermining the entire structure.' 50 
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Two laws and a Constitutional revision later, however, the position of altruism in blood donation remains dominant in public policy, as does the concept of solidarity on which it rests. It has in fact been said that the debate over HIV -infected blood established that principle on an even firmer footing in law, reiterating that society owed a debt to the victims of technological 'progress', particularly of techniques such as pooling on the one hand and on the other, separation of blood products into albumins, immunoglobulins, and factor VIIIY Contract law was the unexpected means through which these cases were settled in favour of the patients, even though there is no contract between patient and doctor in the French public medicine system. Rather, the majority of tribunals involved held that the contrat de fourniture between the transfusion centres and the hospitals could be invoked by the patients not as third parties, but by a 'tacit stipulation' in favour of the patient. 5 2 Whilst in the short term this interpretation benefited patients, in the long term it undermined the strict separation between things and persons: contract law is a strange thing to invoke in the ostensible case of une chose hors commerce. 53 Here, however, we have something akin to the flexible use of separate sticks in the property 'bundle' in the common law: judicious judicial interpretation of property in the body precisely as property in order to afford protections that a system based entirely on personal rights may lack. 54 Although one CCNE opinion after another reiterates the centrality of gift in French bioethics, the position of gratuitous donation is in fact problematic, and the importance of non-commodification merely secondary. What is illicit is not commodification in itself, but commodification of that which belongs to the patrimoine. 55 (Gametes also belong to the patrimoine in a particularly significant way, so that semen is regarded as a gift from one couple to the other. This model imposes strict demands on both the receiving couple (either married or co-habiting for three years) and the donor, who is also required to be in a stable relationship and already the father of at least one healthy child.) Once genetic material or tissue has been removed from the realm of the national patrimoine, into the private market, under procedures laid down and controlled by the state, the state has willingly abnegated its powers over the tissue of individuals, and market rules can then apply. For example, in the CCNE opinion on products derived from human cells 56 , a tissue sample is to be considered as freely donated by the patient to the medical or hospital, allowing the clinicians to develop a product which can be commercialised. Limitations on the price of the product are suggested-so that the price, in good Lockean fashion, should only reflect the added value of the labour to the material, which has no price-but these suggestions have never been enforced. The patient, however, retains no further rights in the tissue or to benefits from its commercialisation once it enters the market domain: exactly the same result as Moore.
But how can tissue belonging to the patrimoine be alienated in the first place? Why is it permissible to diminish the national heritage by gift, any more than by sale? The answer must lie in social solidarity. Gift of blood or tissue to another citizen of the patrie is permissible, because it does not diminish the total holding of the French nation. (Indeed, 'donation' is well-nigh compulsory after death: France operates an 'opt-out' system according to which it is presumed that the deceased person would have consented to organ donation, unless she or he explicitly withdrew consent, while alive, to posthumous organ retrieval. 5 7 ) Because the interests of the patrie take precedence over individual rights, and because the most vulnerable may be more tempted than the rich to sell their blood or tissue in a commercial system, the state has an obligation to protect citizens from themselves by forbidding anyone who might be tempted to sell their blood, rather than give it away. Happily this paternalistic interest coincides with the logic of gift: the more vulnerable will be no more tempted than the wealthiest to give their tissue away, and the total patrimoine will be enhanced, to everyone's benefit.
Thus human tissue may well be une chose hors commerce, a thing outside the realm of commerce 58 , but that does not mean that it cannot be alienated by gift. Provided that gift is mediated through procedures laid down by the state, as Fagot-Largeault argues, 'Human body parts may be said to be common property of that community. Exchanges are made possible by the community acting as the actual owner of all body parts, with the consent of individual persons.' 59 Does this presumption that the state already owns one's body parts actually discourage altruism? France has the worst record in Europe of gratuitous organ donation from living donors: for example, only 2.7 per cent of French adult end-stage renal patients receive a donated kidney from a relative, as against 49 per cent in Norway. 60 (However, the two countries are not strictly comparable, since most transplants in France are cadaveric.)
The French jurist Dominique Thouvenin, in a sceptical dismissal of both gift and gratuity 61 , argues that the principal function of gift is to establish an irrevocable transfer from donor to recipient 62 • The notion of conditional gift 63 is entirely absent in French jurisprudence. In formal terms gift is so irrevocable as to require an agreement witnessed by a notaire. This level of finality and formality lends to the concept of gift of tissue or blood a weight for which there is no equivalent in common law, and against which there is no chance of appeal afterwards. As a protection for patients or research subjects, it is quite insufficient. As Thou venin remarks, 'The law uses ... the word gift, because expressing things in terms of gift ... camouflages the incursion on the body's integrity, and privileges the generosity of the person who decides to give an ill person an organ vital for survival.' 64 Furthermore, the voluntariness of gift is largely fictitious, as is the opposition between gift and the market system. 65 Gift implies counter-gift; we are concerned with a social system characterised by the double obligation of receiving and giving. Thus gift is not the opposite of the market model or of goods circulating without monetary counterpart ... Just as there is no gift, there is no altruistic donation .. [ We must] distinguish between two situations both included under altruistic donation: the person from whom the tissues are taken may not receive any financial recompense, whilst the tissues once taken may be transferred for a market price, or may be used subject to the costs incurred in the taking. 66 
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In Thouvenin's view, the French government has been concerned to preserve a tight distinction between 'altruistic donation', implying no further control by the donor, and the development of 'patrimonial collections' of tissue for the benefit of research and industry. This whited-sepulchre style of argument seems to be borne out by the recent ministerial decree allowing the importation of stem cell lines, not currently part of the 'patrimonial collections' because of the ongoing deadlock over the status of the embryo 67 • In order to preserve France's international research standing, both 'patrimonial collections' and imports of blood products from the USA 68 , or stem cell lines from less 'ethical' countries, such as the UK, will allow France to preserve her principles and her market position.
Is the body the person?
I began this article with a quotation from Jean-Pierre Baud, highlighting the official French doctrine that 'the body is the person'. Baud is an iconoclastic author, the first in a growing lineage, who insists that the body should actually be regarded as a thing and not as a person in French jurisprudence: 'but not just any thing: a thing which, by virtue of reality and its sacred nature, is the object of narrowly limited and controlled legal procedures' 69 • The physical person, he says, is regarded elsewhere in the law as separate from the legal person, which can be a corporation or other disembodied individual. It is only religious dogma, he charges, which keeps the supposedly anti-clerical French from acknowledging frankly that 'man' is master of his own body. Advocating abandonment of the doctrine that tissue separated from the body is mere waste, he asks, 'Which is more damaging for the human person: to consider his body and everything belonging to it as things rigorously protected by property law, or to admit that anything detached from the body has the same status as excrement, but excrement that can be turned to gold? 070 Before closing, I want to spend some time on this underpinning question of whether the body is a thing or the person herself. If the body is the person, tissue retains elements of personhood even once removed 54 from the body. This protection would appear to prohibit full-scale markets in tissue, and thus to have a good practical effect. On a more theoretical plane, it would also presumably be attractive to feminist and post-modem philosophers who maintain that the subject can only be conceived of as an embodied subject, avoiding Cartesian dualism. 71 Is there any reason, on either a pragmatic or a conceptual level, to doubt that the body is the person? Many French scholars and critics of the French system appear to think so, and to believe that the equivalence of body and person has been an insufficiently examined platitude. There are several lines of criticism in a growing literature:
1. We have already seen that the rights of subjects, particularly women, over their own tissue are curtailed in the French system by the presumption that genetic endowments, and tissues to some extent, belong to the patrimoine. This assumption sets up a tension: if the body is the person, and yet the body in some sense belongs to the wider community, how are we to conceive of the embodied subject's rights? In the extreme, the claims of the community might be so pressing that the person is less a subject than the patrimoine itself. That would be an extreme reading, however: although it may be tempting to make the patrimoine into a subject in its own right, as the French philosopher Martine Remond-Gouilloud has written, that would be a category mistake. Yet if things belonging to the patrimoine, such as 'French DNA', are not subjects, they are not straightforward objects either. 72 Similarly, they are both property and not property. As Rabinow writes, 'one of the functions of the institution of patrimony is to provide a means of bridging the domains of property [avoir] and being [etre] . ' 73 The 1994 French bioethics law 94-654 may stipulate that the body cannot be the object of patrimonial rights, but we have already seen that there is presumed consent to the extraction of placental tissue from living 'donors', and for all tissue in the case of cadaveric 'donors', in the name of the patrimoine. More broadly, there is a tension between the notion of patrimoine and that of the body as identified entirely with the subject. If the latter were infallibly true, even altruistic donation of blood or other tissue from one member of the patrie to another would be disallowed, and the patrimoine would dissolve into a loose Hobbesian collection of individual body-subjects. The response of French jurisprudence to this tension has been to allow certain usages, such as blood donation, while retaining an overall degree of control forbidding other usages, such as gamete sale, in the name of protecting the patrimoine. Although French judges continue to reiterate the principle that the body is the subject, in practice they have made a series of concessions to medical reality. 74 
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2. Biotechnology has made the entire notion of the body much more fluid. On the one hand, bodily functions can be replicated or enhanced by objects originally extraneous to the subject, machines such as ventilators and pacemakers, as well as by substances derived from human bodies but through industrial processes, such as factor VIII blood clotting products. On the other, human biomaterials extracted from the body enter into research and commerce as objects, to a greater extent in more commodified economies such as the United States, but also in France, as the example of albumin extracted from the placenta shows. The second development is the primary focus of my attention, but the first has also drawn feminist comment, for example in Donna Haraway's metaphors concerning cyborgs. 75 It becomes much more difficult to insist that the body simply is the person when tissues from the body are no longer physically joined to the person.
As Maria Marzano-Parisoli has written in her excellent Penser le corps, 'in addition to the natural body and its parts, there now exists a series of artificially produced bodily elements which make the distinction between natural body and artificial body much harder to pin down.' 76 The patenting of genetic sequences provides a further illustration of the way in which elements extracted from the body take on a separate existence from that of the original subject, even if that existence is regulated differently in European and US patent law. Another telling and troublesome example is that of hand and face transplants, in which the bodily identity of the donor is a continual reminder to the recipient of another subject's integration into one's own body. 77 In the view of many French commentators, including Baud and Marzano-Parisoli, the way to deal with these ambiguities is not to insist doggedly on the equivalence between subject and body, but to admit that the body is an object, although a particular kind of object over which the full rights of dominium cannot be exercised. 'The body is not a simple worldly object, but rather the object which each of us both has and is; it is a thing, but sui generis; it is that over which we dispose, but not in an absolute manner. 078 The effect of this 'rethinking the body' in the context of French civil law is actually rather similar to using the common-law concept of property as a bundle, as I have advocated. Certain property rights over the body then become permissible; others remain prohibited. The question, of course, is which uses of the body fall into which category. Marzano-Parisoli retains the official French insistence on a distinction between sale and gift, for example. One basis for this distinction is linked to a third set of questions, about using the body instrumentally. 56 3. The proposition that the body is the person (corps-personne) is invoked in the French context to prohibit the use of the body as a mere tool (corps-outil). The body is inviolable because it is identified with the subject, which makes violation not merely impermissible but jurisprudentially impossible: 79 the body is the substratum of the person, and thus innate to the subject of law. In other words, there can be no distinction between the person as rights-holding subject and the body as the object of rights. If the subject is sovereign, however, there is no necessary logical link between these two propositions. We might want to maintain that the sovereign individual should have the right to dispose of her body as she wishes, and indeed that the right to do so is an important cause for feminists to reclaim: hence the growing literature supporting prostitutes' rights over their own bodies, in a neo-liberal style of argument. 80 I do not myself accept that argument, but I do want to draw attention to the illicit slide from the assertion that the body is the subject to the claim that the subject does not have the right to dispose of her body as she sees fit. In the extreme cases of slavery or of the sale of life-sustaining organs, we can see the contradiction between disposing of one's body, in the name of free action as a subject, and the subsequent extinguishing of the subject in whose name this freedom is supposed to operate. A contract of slavery, for example, is logically invalid because it extinguishes the legal existence of one party to the contract. It is therefore consistent in philosophical and legal terms to bar those forms of disposing of the body. The more difficult cases concern disposing of parts of the body which do not threaten the continued existence of the subject.
Kant is often cited as the locus of the assertion that we are barred from using our bodies as mere tools, since that would entail treating ourselves as mere means-although to our own ends rather than those of another subject. (In the French context this prohibition is frequently expressed as an affront to our human dignity, our intrinsic value as members of the kingdom of ends, rather than the relative values that prevail in the commodified marketplace.) While Kant clearly states that we are not authorised to sell any parts of our bodies, he seems to make exceptions for non-vital elements such as hair, although he is uneasy even about that. In other situations, for example in the permissible amputation of a diseased foot, Kant does appear to draw the dualistic distinction between body as object and moral person as subject, so that we are entitled to 'use' the body in such a way as to preserve the person. I have put 'use' in inverted commas because amputating a diseased foot does not seem to be 'using' the body as a tool in the same way as selling a part of the body, even selling a body part in order to keep body and soul together, as it were.
Both the Kantian and the official French position assume that the person is the sole 'occupant' of the body, and that without the body the person cannot exist. In a feminist analysis, the first proposition is not so obvious. Women's lived experience of pregnancy casts a different light on the equivalence between person and body. However, the experience of miscarriage or abortion does seem, in my view, to uphold the Kantian distinction between disposing of a part of the body that poses a threat to the subject, and using bodily tissues as a tool for profit. A Kantian feminist might also object to the use of the placenta or of umbilical cord blood, both of which belong to the mother, for any other purposes, particularly commercial ones: they are not diseased parts of the body which must be excised in order to preserve the mother's life. Equating the body with the person, as official French doctrine does, thus leads, in a feminist analysis, to consequences contradictory to actual positions in French policy. CONCLUSION At the time of writing (October 2004) it appears highly likely that the result of the August 2004 bioethics laws will be to further weaken the once-sovereign French insistence on non-commercialisation of the body. (Indeed, my analysis in this article has already suggested that this supposedly sovereign principle was already something of a puppet monarch.) Among the disturbing elements of the new legislation appear to be:
• The formal and explicit extension of the opt-out principle to commercially valuable tissue such as the placenta 81 ; • Express permission for the utililisation of parts or 'products' of the human body for other scientific or medical purposes than those for which they were first intended, unless the patient explicitly objects 82 ; • The softening of the previously strong position against any incursion on the human body, so that the exemption in favour of the patient's own therapeutic needs is now augmented by 'the therapeutic needs of others, in exceptional instances' 83 ; • The greatly expanded list of purposes for which tissue can be taken as a gift from a living person; 84 • The removal of any distinction between different levels of transformation of human tissue through research techniques or industrial processes, and the inclusion of genetic material explicitly under the same heading as other biomaterial; 85 • The lack of any distinction between public and private biotechnology 'operators' . 86 
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The first effect of these concessions to commodification is greatly to undermine French exceptionalism. The French position on biobanks, tissue collection and commercialisation of body 'product' increasingly resembles no system so much as the United Kingdom's, particularly because the 2004law sets up a new 'Agence de la Biomedicine' 87 with functions similar to (but wider than) those of the new UK Human Tissue Authority. Much of the 2004 legislation seems at first glance to rely on this agency to ensure that no ill is done by the numerous relaxations of principle elsewhere in the statute. For example, no tissues or cells can be transferred to any other establishment without authorisation from the new agency, which may help to inhibit totally free global markets in biomaterial. However, the new French agency will encounter a much more commodified situation at its inception in January 2005 than if it had begun operations fifteen years ago. Furthermore, generally speaking, France is accustomed to relying on the state to regulate, but where the actors to be regulated are not French citizens but multinational firms, the modes of governance required lie outside the state's previous experience. 88 Even in the 1994 legislation, many French analysts had already noted the tension between the notion of the corps-sujet and corps-outil, particularly in the light of the doctrine of the patrimoine. The second effect of the 2004 laws is to move the position of the body even closer to the object end of the spectrum-despite the ostensibly immovable principle in French jurisprudence that the human subject is an embodied person and not a thing. This is a disappointing outcome. As Rabinow says in a backhanded compliment to the CCNE, 'the committee was instrumental in transforming France's official ethical mood from proud affirmation of acts of benevolent giving to a defensive one requiring vigilance against transgressive threats.' 89 Despite its vigilance, however, the threat of commodification has not been avoided in the French context. prostitution,' forthcoming in Jeroen Doemernik and Christien van den Anker (eds), Trafficking and Women's Rights (Palgrave). 81. Article L. 1245-2: 'Les tissus, les cellules et les produits du corps humain, preleves a !'occasion d'une intervention chirurgicale pratiquee dans I' interet de la personne operee, ainsi que le placenta, peuvent etre utilises a des fins therapeutiques ou scientifiques, sauf opposition exprimee par elle apres qu'elle a ete informee des finalites de cette utilitsation.' The only restriction here is the catch-all phrase 'therapeutic or scientific ends' ; almost any applied use of tissue will probably qualify as 'scientific', if ostensibly in the interests of further research. 82. Title II, article 7, revision of article L.l211-2: 'L'utilisation d'elements et de produits du corps humain a une fin medicale ou scientifique autre que celle pour laquelle ils ont ete preleves ou collectes est possible, sauf opposition exprimee par la personne sur laquelle a ete opere ce prelevement ou cette collecte, dfiment informee au prealable de cette autre fin.' The only exception is embryonic and foetal tissue. 83. Article 9, A, revision of first paragraph of article 16-3 of Civil Code: 'II ne peut etre porte atteinte a l'integrite du corps humain qu'en cas de necessite medicale pour la personne ou a titre exceptionnel dans }'interet therapeutique d' autrui., 84. Article 12, revising article 1241-1 of the 1994 law to read: 'Le prelevement de tissus ou de cellules ou la collecte de produits du corps humain sur une personne vivante en vue de don ne peut etre opere que dans un but therapeutique ou scientifique ou de realisation ou de controle des dispositifs medicaux de diagnostic in vitro ou de controle de qualite des analyses de biologiemedicale ou dans le cadre des expertises et des contrOles techniques realises sur les tissus ou sur les cellules ou sur les produits du corps humain .. .' 85. Article L. 1243-1. 86. Article 1243-3. 87. Article L. 1418-1. 88. Rabinow, op. cit., note 26, p. 73. 89. Rabinow, op. cit., note 26, p. 73.
